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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PAUL HOUGHTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.

Case No. 20030931-SC

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
In an Order filed on November 3,2003, the district court ruled on several related
discovery motions. R. 1718-22. The district court granted the defendants' motion for a
protective order and denied the remaining discovery motions. R. 1720. Plaintiffs filed a
petition for permission to appeal this interlocutory order which was granted by this Court
on January 15,2004. Interlocutory appeals, such as this, come within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0) (2002). The Court is without subject matter jurisdiction because no notice of
claim was filed by any remaining member of the certified class and the only notice of
claim that was filed did not raise the attorney fees issue presented by this appeal. Rushton
v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36, fl8,977 P.2d 1201.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. This appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
of the named plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim that raised the attorney fees issue
that they seek to raise and because no notice of claim was filed by the unnamed plaintiffs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at
any time by either party or by the court. Weiser v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 932 P.2d 596,
597 (Utah 1997). Failure to comply with the notice of claim requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Thomas v.
Lewis. 2001 UT 49, ^[20,26 P.3d 217. "In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its
legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by the defendants'
motions to dismiss (R. 753-801,924-962,979-987,1027-1037) that were denied by the
district court. R. 1288-89.
2 This Court should not issue an advisory opinion as to how State v. McCoy. 2000
UT 39,999 P.2d 572 should be applied to hypothetical situations where no concrete set of
facts are before the Court
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to the appeal and does not call
for the review of the district court's decision.
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3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its challenged ruling on
discovery motions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Because trial courts have broad discretion in
matters of discovery, this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretiono" Green v. Louden
2001 UT 62, K37,29 P.3d 638; Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, J16,30 P.3d 436 (denial
of a motion to compel discovery is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: The district court ruled on the relevant discovery
motions in its Order filed on November 3,2003. R. 1718-22.
4. The district court's challenged discovery Order correctly interpreted this
Court's decision in McCoy.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its
legal conclusions.11 Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: See Issue Three, supra.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient — Consent of
department required - Department's right to intervene —
Department's interests protected - Attorney's fees and costs. (1998)
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle,
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department
has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance,
without the department's written consent,
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action
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commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the
same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has become
obligated to provide medical assistance.
(2) (a) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent as
required by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision,
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in
the action.
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to
which the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has
provided and retains its right to commence an independent action against
the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what terms
the interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced
by the recipient.
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action
that is commenced with the department's written consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 Claim against state or its employee - Time
for filing notice. (Supp. 2003)
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment,
or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of
any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This complaint wasfiledon October 27,1995. R. 1-47. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs made various challenges to Utah's Medicaid Benefits Recovery Act. The
complaint sought the certification of two classes of plaintiffs. By an Orderfiledon
January 29,1996, the district court certified the following two classes.
Class I plaintiffs are represented by Paul Houghton. This class is defined as
individuals injured by the acts of a third party, who became Medicaid
4
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recipients, and whose medical bills were paid in part by the State of Utah,
through the Utah State Department of Health. These class members are
also defined by the fact that they had a third-party liability ("TPL") action
against the person or entity who or which injured them, resulting in the
imposition or priority claim on a lien by the State of Utah pursuant to the
Medical Benefits Recovery Act, UCA §26-19-1, et seq. Class I defendants
are further defined by the fact that none of them had counsel in their
dealings or negotiations with the State of Utah regarding the claim or lein,
which was paid on a first priority basis from the proceeds of their TPL
claim.
Class II plaintiffs are identical in every respect to Class I plaintiffs
with the following exceptions: Class II plaintiffs retained counsel and
actually filed actions or made claims through attorneys, against the liable
third parties. In most or all cases, these attorneys were involved in the
negotiations with the State of Utah regarding payment of the lien claims by
the state.
R. 99-100.
Pursuant to a motion of the defendants, the plaintiffs' lawyers were disqualified by
an order of the district court filed on July 30,1996. R. 280-99. On appeal, this Court
Teversed the district court's decision. Houghton v. Dep't of Health. 962 P.2d 58 (Utah
1998)(HoughtonI).
On remand, after numerous motions, the district court dismissed this action with
prejudice as to both classes on all issues on November 13,2000. R. 707-9. On appeal,
this Court affirmed the dismissal of all the Class I plaintiffs challenges to the
constitutionality of the act. Houghton v. Dep't of Health. 2002 UT 101, f 11, 57 P.3d
1067ffloughtonID. This Court affirmed the dismissal of all of the claims of the Class II
plaintiffs as well with the exception of the attorney fees claims. 14 These attorney fees
claims were remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
5
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It was undisputed that the named Class II plaintiffs attorney fees claims failed on
the merits. R. 508, 513, 515, 556-58; Houghton II. 2002 UT 101 at1f6. The question on
appeal was whether the class should have been dismissed without prejudice because of
this failure,1 or the matter remanded for discovery and naming of appropriate class
representatives. This Court chose the second alternative. Id. at ^f 10.
On remand, the defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. R. 753-801, 924-962, 979-987, 1027-1037. The district court
denied these motions and permitted the plaintiffs to add two new class representatives. R.
1288-89. On November 3,2003, the district court ruled on several related discovery
motions and the defendants' motion to decertify the remaining class of plaintiffs.
R. 1718-22. The district court granted the defendants' motion for a protective order and
denied the remaining discovery motions. R. 1720. It neither granted nor denied the
defendants' motion to decertify the remaining class of plaintiffs. Instead, the court
permitted limited discovery relating solely to the class certification issue. Id.

Plaintiffs

filed a petition for permission to appeal this interlocutory order which was granted by this
Court on January 15,2004.

1

The defendants admitted that the dismissal with prejudice of the potential claims
of the unnamed members of Class II (as opposed to the properly dismissed claims of the
named plaintiffs) was in error.
6
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A notice of claim was filed on July 20,1995 by plaintiffs Paul Houghton, Damian
Henderson, Billie Henderson and Wayne Rubens. R. 37-39,792-95. No other plaintiffs
filed a notice of claim. The plaintiffs' notice of claim does not identify any cause of
action for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). The complaint
that was incorporated by reference into the notice of claim does not state such a claim. R.
1-36. Such a claim is not found in the list of the relief requested by the plaintiffs. R. 3435SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' notice of claim was inadequate. It did not assert any claim for attorney
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). It did not include each plaintiffs name
as required. This Court is therefore without subject matter jurisdiction to consider this
appeal and should dismiss the same.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to issue an advisory opinion. There is no factual setting to
frame the legal question. No facts are known at this time concerning the circumstances or
the potential claims of any member of the remaining plaintiff class. This Court should
dismiss this appeal rather than issue a decision that could only be advisory.
The challenged decision of the district court dealt with discovery. The court ruled
on how much discovery would be permitted for the limited purpose of the defendants'
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motion to decertify the remaining class of plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have failed to show
that the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion.
The challenged decision of the district court simply followed the exact language of
this Court's decision in McCoy. The court ruled that discovery could be had to determine
how many Medicaid recipients had hired an "attorney to recover damages from a third
party, and the State elect[ed] to recover its claim directlyfromthe recipient." R. 1720.
Neither McCoy nor the district court ruled on all possible permutations of factual issues
that might arise under Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). The district court's decision,
on the limited issue addressed, followed the precedent of this Court and the court of
appeals and should be affirmed on appeal.
ARGUMENT
L THIS COURT IS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL BECAUSE NO
APPROPRIATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS FILED
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. Both this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals
have held that the filing of the notice of claim required by the Act is a jurisdictional
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Rushton v. Salt Lake
County,!999 UT 36,1J18,977 P.2d 1201; Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.. 828
P.2d 535,540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245,249-50 (Utah
1988). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental
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Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Lamarr; Rushton,
1999 UT 36, ^19; Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975).
At the relevant time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that:
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim
is filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 2003) (in part).
The only cause of action remaining is for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 26-19-7(4) (1998). The notice of claim only lists four individuals as plaintiffs. It did
not include a claim for attorney fees pursuant to section 7. It has been undisputed that the
four named plaintiffs do not possess a claim for attorney fees pursuant to this statute. The
unnamed plaintiffs failed to file the necessary notice of claim. Even if the notice of claim
that was filed were to be attributed to plaintiffs whose names do not appear in it, it would
still be ineffective because the cause of action the plaintiffs now raise does not appear in
the notice of claim that was filed.
A. All Plaintiffs Names Must Appear in the Notice of Claim
One of the mandatory requirements for a notice of claim is that it contain the
names of all plaintiffs.
The only notice of claim timely filed in this case listed only PGC and
Mr. Roberts as claimants. Plaintiffs argue that this notice was sufficient
for all plaintiffs because ff[t]here is no case law ... [that] asserts that the
[A]ct requires a specific name to be on the notice of claim when all the
governmental entities involved know who the plaintiffs are.'1 However, we

9
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note that the statute itself clearly requires any person filing suit against a
government agency to file a notice of claim. In other words, each plaintiffs
name must be on the notice of claim. Although the purpose of a notice of
claim is to ffprovide[ ] the governmental entity an opportunity to correct the
condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the
matter without the expense of litigation," as plaintiffs themselves note, we
have consistently held that those purposes are fulfilled only by the timely
filing of a notice of claim-even when the entity charged had actual notice of
the circumstances of the claim. See Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp.. 2000
UT 69, \ 21,9 P.3d 762 (" 'We have consistently required strict compliance
with the requirements of the Immunity Act. Actual notice does not cure a
party's failure to meet these requirements.1" (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake
County.. 1999 UT 36, If 19,977 P.2d 1201)). Because the notice of claim
filed in this case included only the claims of PGC and Mr. Roberts, we hold
that it was insufficient to support the action in behalf of Lynn Clayson,
Robert Cordner, Paul Carnesecca, Frank Camesecca, and Richard Bona.
The claims of these plaintiffs were therefore properly dismissed.
Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanpete County. 2002 UT 17, ^[10,42 P.3d 379 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
If the names of the plaintiffs are not contained on the notice of claim, the purpose
behind this statutory provision cannot be fulfilled. The notice of claim is intended to
provide the government an opportunity to consider and act upon the individual claims
raised. A notice of claim provides the government the opportunity to rectify any
problems, evaluate the claim, and consider settling without the expense of litigation. Id.
at^lO.
By filing notice of claim in such a manner, Hall deprived the state of the
opportunity to assess his allegations and to decide, as required by the
statute, whether to approve or deny the claim. Indeed, without this
opportunity the state could be hauled into court at every turn and with no
notice at all—even in cases where a claim is wholly frivolous, can be

10
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resolved without lengthy deliberation, or is otherwise suited for resolution
out of court.
Hallv.Dep'tofCorr.. 2001 UT 34, ^[26,24 P.3d 958 (filing of lawsuit before notice of
claim was denied deprived the courts of subject matter jurisdiction).
Because the plaintiffs names were not contained in the notice of claim, the courts
do not have subject matter jurisdiction over their claims, if any, for attorney fees. This
Court has routinely rejected claims that actual notice is sufficient. Pigs Gun Club. 2002
UT 17 at TJ10. At most, the notice of claim in question provided inquiry notice. It did not
provide even actual notice of who might be making a claim, but left the defendants to
speculate as to what potential plaintiffs might make claims. The notice of claim does not
meet the requirements of the statute. Strict compliance with this statute is required. Id.
This appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. All Claims of the Plaintiffs Must Appear in the Notice of Claim
Just as the notice of claim did not state the name of all plaintiffs, it did not assert a
claim for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). The
Governmental Immunity Act requires that the notice of claim set forth the nature of the
claim asserted. Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2003). "[W]here the
government grants statutoryrightsof action against itself, any conditions placed on those
rights must be followed precisely." Hall 2001 UT 34 at f23. In Yearslev v. Jensen. 798
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), this Court held that a plaintiff could not raise a cause of action
that was not asserted in her notice of claim. The plaintiff sought to amend her complaint
11
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to add a cause of action for malicious prosecution where her notice of claim only asserted
claims of assault and battery. In finding the notice of claim inadequate for this new
claim, this Court explained that "[violence would have been done to the requirement of
section 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(ii)... if the court had permitted the amended complaint to vary so
profoundly from the notice." 798 P.2d at 1129. See also Stralev v. Hallidav. 2000 UT
App 38, TJ15,997 P.2d 338 (notice of claim that stated only a representative capacity
claim against a government employee did not give the courts jurisdiction over a personal
capacity cause of action).
Because the plaintiffs' notice of claim did not assert the attorney fees claim that
they now raise, it fails to provide this Court with subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ISSUE AN ADVISORY OPINION
The plaintiffs ask this Court to advise the district court on how State v. McCoy.
2000 UT 39,999 P.2d 572, should be interpreted and applied to hypothetical situations.
No facts are before this Court. The district court's order dealt solely with what discovery
would be permitted in relationship with an outstanding motion to decertify the class of
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have failed to state any facts as to the actual circumstances of
any potential plaintiff that may be a member of the class in question.
This Court does not issue mere advisory opinions. Miller v. Weaver. 2003 UT 12,
TJ26,66 P3d 592; Lvon v. Bateman. 228 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 1951) (Utah courts are not
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supposed to be "a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory
opinions"). Its decisions are to be based "on an accrued state of facts as opposed to a
hypothetical state of facts." Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). But no such
state of facts is known in this lawsuit.
In McCoy, this Court dealt with a specific set of facts. The plaintiff was a private
attorney who had obtained a recovery from a third party for his client. This Court
determined, based on the facts of that specific case, whether the State of Utah was
required to pay a proportionate part of the private attorney's fee for obtaining the
recovery. This Court refused to issue an advisory opinion concerning what the outcome
of that case would have been if the facts had been different. 2000 UT 39 at f 18, n.4.
Because the specific facts surrounding the claims of potential members of the
plaintiff class are unknown, a decision issued on this appeal could only be a mere
advisory opinion. Whether a specific, currently unknown plaintiff, has a claim for
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998) would depend on the facts
surrounding his or her claim. As the district court noted.
The relevant factors that the Court of the jury might consider include the
following:
(a) Whether the State acted through counsel.
(b) Whether the proposed settlement was agreed to in principle before the
State asserted its lien.
(c) Whether the recipient was in possession of the settlement proceeds.
(d) Whether the settlement expressly excluded the State's lien.
(e) Whether under the terms of the settlement payment of the State's lien
directly reduced the injured party's recovery.
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(f) Whether the State performed any independent investigation of the merits
of the third party claim.
R. 1590-91. This list of potentially significant facts is not complete. It fails to list the
issue of whether the private attorney's failure to cooperate precluded the State from
recovering from the responsible third person, the fact situation that this Court refused to
speculate concerning in McCoy. Many other factors might be relevant to this Court's
consideration of a particular plaintiffs claim. Without having those facts before the
Court the proper decision can not be made.
This Court should refuse to issue an advisory opinion as requested by the
plaintiffs. Instead, this appeal of a discovery order should be dismissed. A decision on
the merits of a particular plaintiffs claims should await the accruing of a concrete set of
facts upon which such a decision could be based.
IIL THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN
TO HAVE BEEN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The district court's order granted the defendants' motion for a protective order.
R. 1720, In granting this motion, the district court also denied conflicting discovery
motions made by the plaintiffs. The discovery that was to be permitted was limited to the
question of the defendants' motion to decertify the class action. Id. Yet in their brief, the
plaintiffs do not address the issues presented by this motion. The motion was based on
the federal and state statutes that prohibit disclosure of the medicaid and health data
sought in the discovery. R. 1056-60. The defendants also claimed that the sought after
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discovery was overly broad. R. 1060-64. At most, the plaintiffs may be said to have
challenged the overbreath question so far as it relates to McCoy, but no other part of the
order. No effort is made to explain how the limitations placed on discovery concerning
the motion to decertify the remaining class of plaintiffs was an abuse of discretion.
This Court reviews the correctness of the district court's decision under an abuse
of discretion standard. Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 62, p 7 , 2 9 P.3d 638 ("Because trial
courts have broad discretion in matters of discovery, this issue is reviewed for abuse of
discretion."); Pack v. Case. 2001 UT App 232,1fl6, 30 P.3d 436 (denial of a motion to
compel discovery is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).
Plaintiffs have failed to show that the district court's order was an abuse of
discretion. They have not even challenged the basis for this decision. Instead, the
plaintiffs seek only an advisory opinion as to how this Court's decision in McCoy should
be applied to hypothetical situations that are not currently before either this Court or the
district court.
The court of appeals' recent decision in Walker v. Office of Recovery Services.
2004 UT App 101 (a copy of this unpublished opinion is attached as Addendum A)
supports the conclusion that the district court's decision was not an abuse of discretion.2
In WalkerT the State of Utah spent its own resources to recover its lien directly from a the

2

An unpublished decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is binding on lower courts
and may be cited, to the degree it is persuasive, to this Court. Grand County v. Rogers.
2002 UT 25,1J16,44 P.3d 734.
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liable third party. The court in Walker expressly rejected the broad interpretation of
McCoy that the plaintiffs put forward in this appeal Instead, the court upheld the trial
court's decision that the State of Utah does not need to reimburse a private attorney when
the State expends its own resources to obtain its recovery directlyfromthe responsible
third party. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to come to the same
conclusion in its discovery order. Indeed, until a further decision from this Court, the
district court would be bound to follow the court of appeals' decision in Walker. The
plaintiffs have failed to show that the challenged order was an abuse of discretion.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S
DECISION IN McCOY
The only issue raised by the plaintiffs is the proper interpretation of Utah Code
Ann, § 26-19-7(4) (1998).
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action
that is commenced with the department's written consent.
McCoy decided "that under subsection (4), when the State elects to recover
directlyfroma recipient who has expressly excluded the State's claim from any attempt to
Tecoverfroma third party, the State must pay the attorney fees incurred in procuring the
State's share of the settlement proceeds." 2000 UT 39 at ^[18.
The challenged district court's decision simply followed this Court's decision in
McCoy. "Under the McCoy case holding and its supporting facts, the State of Utah must
pay attorney fees incurred in procuring its share of settlement proceeds where at a
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minimum an injured recipient of State medical assistance hires an attorney to recover
damagesfroma third party, and the State elects to recover its claim directly from the
recipient" R. 1720.
The district court simply sought to apply the language of this Court's opinion. It is
the plaintiffs who seek to have this Court reconsider McCoy, and other decisions, instead
of reviewing the actual decision of the district court. None of the other issues raised by
the plaintiffs were addressed by the district court's order and they should not be decided
on this appeal.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to amend McCoy to require the State of Utah to pay
private attorney fees even if the state recovers its lien directly from a third party and not
from the Medicaid recipient. Appellants' Brief at 29-33,37-39. This is contrary to the
decision in McCoy.
In sum, while the Act provides discretion to the State when selecting
a suitable avenue for recovering medical assistance, each method of
recovery requires the State to pay its share of attorney fees. The State may
(1) take action directly against the third party, for which the State pays its
own expenses; (2) grant consent to recipients seeking to pursue the State's
claim, whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney
fees and, if any, its proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3)
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after the recipient recovers
from the third party, in which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by
reasonable attorney fees.
Id, at 119.
Plaintiffs ask not that the State of Utah pay its own expenses under the first
alternative, but that it be required to pay the attorney fees for a private counsel who did
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not assist in the State's recovery. Such a recovery does not promote fairness. Instead
such a rule would encourage the State of Utah to never seek to recover its lien from the
liable third party. The State of Utah, by doing so, would spend its own time and resources
and still have to pay for a private attorney whose services it did not use. In order to save
scarce resources, the State of Utah would have an incentive to always seek reimbursement
from the recipient. This result is poor public policy.
This is also contrary to the court of appeals' decision in Walker. 2004 UT App
101. There the court upheld a trial court's decision that the State did not have to
reimburse a private attorney when it spent its own resources to investigate and seek
reimbursement. This result encourages the State of Utah to recover its lien directly from
the third party, instead of from the Medicaid recipient.
The plaintiffs also ask this Court to rule, for the first time, that private attorneys
can recover their fees even if they never sought the State's consent to bring an action
against the liable third party as required by law. Appellants' Brief at 33-35. The district
court did not address this issue and it is not part of the challenged decision. R. 1718-21.
Utah law prohibits Medicaid recipients from filing a claim or commencing an
action for recovery of medical costs of the same injury or disease for which the the State
of Utah provided medical assistance without the written consent of the Department of
Health or the Office of Recovery Services (ORS). Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(a)
(1998). Section 7 protects both the liable third party as well as the State "from ill-
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informed or devious actions by the recipient." S.S. v. State. 942 P.2d 439,441 (Utah
1998)- It also ensures that the recipient's preemptive action does not cost the State its
right to third party payments which are in settlement or are already in the hands of the
beneficiary. Id. If the recipient proceeds without Medicaid's written consent, the
department is not bound by any decision, judgment or settlement and it may recover the
medical assistance it provided form either the recipient orfromany party to which the
proceeds were made payable. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)(a) (1998). "Payments made
by a third party do not legally become property of the recipient until after a valid
settlement which necessarily must include reimbursement to Medicaid." S.S. v. State.
942 P.2d at 441. Reviewing the statutes as a whole, a Medicaid recipient's attorney is
prohibited from recovering attorney fees if consent is not sought.
The district court did not address the issue of cooperation raised by the plaintiffs.
Appellants' Brief at 43-44. It is not properly before this Court on this appeal. This issue
is factually intensive and not conducive to being decided in the current appeal that is
devoid of any factual setting.
The district court's order simply followed this Court's decision in McCoy. It did
not seek to answer all hypothetical questions and applications left open by McCov. The
district court's decision should be affirmed on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the defendants ask this Court to dismiss this appeal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because it seeks an advisory opinion. If this
Court reaches the merits of this appeal, it should affirm the district court's discovery
order because the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Respectfully submitted this i f / ^ d a y of June, 2004.
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Petitioners argue that the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) should
share in their attorney fees because their attorney recovered the
funds that fully satisfied the State's Medicaid lien. ORS counters
that it should not pay any of Petitioners1 attorney fees because it
expended its own efforts to collect on the lien, and did not consent
to Petitioners' representation.
When seeking to recover medical costs paid to a Medicaid recipient,
the State may (1) take action directly against the third party, for
which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to
recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim, whereby the State's
recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney fees . . . ; or (3)
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after the recipient
recovers from the third party, in which case the State's recovery
shall be reduced by reasonable attorney fees.
State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39,119, 999 P.2d 572. Petitioners argue that
the trial court erred in concluding that the present case fits under
the first collection approach described in McCoy. We disagree.
Petitioners' granddaughter, A.B.W., was injured in an accident and
treated by Intermountain Health Care (IHC). ORS was notified by IHC
of the accident and of a third party who was potentially liable for
A-B.W.'s expenses. ORS immediately contacted A.B.W.'s mother and
inquired about the facts and circumstances of the accident. Later
that day, ORS identified State Farm as the third party, and proceeded
to speak with an adjuster for State Farm. The adjuster admitted that
State Farm accepted responsibility for the accident. The following
dayr ORS sent a Notice of Lien to State Farm and Petitioners'
counsel. The Notice of Lien included a cover page stating that the
State was working to recover the full amount of the lien from State
Farm and that ORS would not pay any attorney fees for efforts by
Petitioners' counsel without a prior written collection agreement.
Nearly eleven months after the accident, or six months after ORS had
filed its claim, Petitioners' counsel requested ORS's consent to
enter into a collection agreement to pursue the Medicaid claim. ORS
denied the request, stating that ORS had already investigated the
case and State Farm had accepted liability. After denying consent,
ORS advised State Farm that Petitioners' counsel did not represent
the State's claim and demanded direct payment from State Farm. We
conclude that, on its own initiative, ORS discovered the identity of
the third party, filed a Notice of Lien, and obtained State Farm's
admission of liability. ORS spent its own resources to investigate
and seek reimbursement before any request was made by Petitioners'
counsel.
The third option identified in McCoy is inapplicable to this case.
See 2000 UT 39 at 519. The Medical Benefits Recovery Act provides
that ,fa recipient
may
..
. Lawor
settle
. . . a claim
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against a third party for recovery of medical costs . . . for which
the department has provided
• • • medical assistance, without the department's written consent."
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1) (a) (1998). A Medicaid recipient must
therefore "seek the State's consent before attempting to recover from
a third party for any medical costs paid by the State." McCoy, 2000
UT 39 at 114. Here, while it is true that Petitioners' counsel sought
consent from ORS before trying to recover from State Farm, such
consent was not forthcoming.
We therefore affirm.-^-J-

Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Petitioners also argue that it would be unfair to them not to
require ORS to pay their attorney fees because ORS benefitted from
Petitioners1 actions. While a court has inherent equitable power to
award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the
interest of justice and equity, it can do so only "in the absence of
a statutory or contractual authorization." Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). Here, the Medical Benefits
Recovery Act clearly applies.
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